Human Rights and Democracy in EU-ASEAN Relations

Human Rights and Democracy in EU-ASEAN Relations

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In the third panel, the Impact Group took a concrete and contested policy field in its focus: Human Rights and Democracy. Participants outlined that this issue constitutes a matter of delicacy in the interregional relations.

1. A normative debate?

Founded on normative arguments, the EU is regularly pressured by civil society actors to use its potential leverage to pressure for ‘improved’ human rights conduct in Southeast Asia. But is this an adequate approach? Can one even speak of a common perception of human rights both between and within the two regions? How and why have these conceptions changed, since human rights became an explicit interregional issue in the 1990s and how serious are the actors about them? These were the guiding questions for the presentations of Cesar Ong, student of law at the San Beda College , Manila, and Imke Pente, PhD Candidate at Freie Universität Berlin, as well as the following open debate among the workshop participants. The panel was chaired by Kilian Spandler, Assistant Director of the South and East Asia division at IFAIR e. V.

2. Varying perceptions on the concept of human rights

Ong outlined in the first panel presentation that both regions hold different views on human rights concepts. The EU is focused on a universalist understanding, ASEAN and its member states see human rights in a more nuanced, ‘unique’ light. In this vein, democracy has to be interpreted before the background of distinct historic and cultural positions of the respective countries. Otherwise, it will be understood as a colonial product and a Western concept. With reference to Huntington, Ong added that the East is thought to have its own Asian values by many scholars. But not only varying perceptions make an interregional human rights dialogue difficult. A different way of communication between both regions has to be noted: The EU is primarily outcome-oriented in its debates, both on bilateral and supra-national level; ASEAN countries do not regard this as crucial, they focus on a more informal cooperation culture. Thus, any progress in Western human rights discourse has to be interpreted in the light of the instrumental value of the discourse for ASEAN: participation is primarily taking place in order to gain reputation vis-á-vis the Western world and to play at the international table.

3. Economic interests vs. human rights?

In the following, Pente in her presentation first of all outlined the state of democracy in SEA (see Figure 1): No consolidated democracy exists as of today, Thailand features a deteriorating democracy record and the CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) countries qualify as full autocracies. Against this backdrop, one could expect a strong effort by the European Union to improve the human rights situation in these countries, given the EU’s self-perception as a normative actor. Yet, proactive efforts by the EU to enhance human rights and democracy through conditionality and outspoken criticism were rejected by the ASEAN member states as neo-colonialism. In order not to jeopardize economic opportunities in the ASEAN region, the European Commission resolved the trade-off between human rights policies and business interests in favor of the latter. However, the extensive strategic announcements by the Commission failed to be substantiated due to reservations of some EU member states towards human rights violations in some of the ASEAN member states, most notably Indonesia, Cambodia and Myanmar.

 Democracy Status of ASEAN member states

Figure 1: Democracy status of ASEAN member states

Pente illustrated that ASEAN is “not more than the sum of its parts”: a close look at the ASEAN Charter, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights and the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration reveals that the member states keep on holding the reins. Regional commitments do not exceed the national status quo and are thus limited to the common denominator. On these grounds, Pente concludes that the national governments’ attitudes to human rights and democracy are pivotal for regional advancements.

4. The case of Myanmar

Both presenters picked up the case of Myanmar as crucial for understanding the human rights discourse between and within both regions. As Ong outlined, differences between EU and ASEAN became evident in the 1991 dispute on how to react to human rights violations in Myanmar, when the EU pressured the Southeast Asian nations for a critical response. ASEAN has been particularly critical of any links of foreign aid to policy demands from the European side which, as Ong depicts, has to be interpreted in the light of fears of neocolonialism Pente agreed to this description: The Myanmar case blocked EU-ASEAN cooperation due to concerns by ASEAN member states for interference in their national affairs – especially when they were in the focus of the international debate just as much (e.g. Indonesia and the case of East Timor). More recently, however, ASEAN has proven to be able to take a tough stance on human rights issues, e.g. during the 2007 crackdowns on protesters again in Myanmar, as Ong describes. Pente interprets this finding: ASEAN questions any interference especially from a perspective of Western values, at the same time it is responsive to potential economic gains – after the FTA negotiations between both regions began, ASEAN at least officially committed to human rights and democracy.

5. Strengthen civil society and further labor standards in ASEAN?

Pente put forward clear recommendations from these issues: First, the EU should strengthen civil society in SEA and thus the demand side for human rights. Second, the EU should link market access to labor rights and thus use its economic leverage. Some participants agreed and presented concrete cases, e.g. from Malaysia, where standards for palm oil production already improved due to this ‘sneaky approach’. Still, a culturally sensitive approach should be taken, other participants added. It is telling that HR issues are not discussed in the political community pillar, but on the social and cultural level. And it has to be ensured that EU Human Rights policy is not separating ASEAN into a ‘pro- and anti-Western’-fraction. Thus, the member states’ international involvement in human rights and democracy-related debates should complement the support to national civil society groups. It was mentioned that poor labor standards are considered a comparative advantage and base for economic development by governments. It was added, that economic development at the same time has the function of enhancing government capacities to a degree that enables HR protection in all its dimensions in the first place. Last but not least, ASEAN governments are partially not even exerting effective governance over their own people and territory. Under these conditions, ‘politics of survival’ are the consequence, where institutions are both feared (for their potential autonomy) and fostered (to solve long-term capacity problems) by national governments.

At the same time, Ong suggested that the international community should continue to assert that Human Rights be included as a prerequisite in gaining international legitimacy. While the external pressure may have proved to provide slow results, the ASEAN’s desire to gain international legitimacy will be a potent tool for it to take the Human Rights issue seriously. This necessarily complements the proposal of Pente in leveraging the Human Rights issue through bilateral channels instead of engaging the ASEAN as one monolithic bloc.

6. The EU side of the coin

Moreover, it was also noted that the ‘Western’ HR concept could be outdated and needs to be revised (e.g. issues of statelessness and international migration are missed out, participants added). Additionally, the HR-conduct of the EU needs to improve dramatically if it is not to lose its credibility, for example when it comes to intra-EU migration (e.g. of the Roma minority) just as much as the dramatic refugee situation on the EU borders. While these shortcomings of the EU might not attract public attention, ASEAN elites are taking note and hold a mirror up to EU delegations when discussing HR.

 Reported by Cesar Ong, Imke Pente and Lukas Rudolph

Read the reports of the other panels and find additional information on the workshop on the >> [Impact Group website].

[:en]

In the third panel, the Impact Group took a concrete and contested policy field in its focus: Human Rights and Democracy. Participants outlined that this issue constitutes a matter of delicacy in the interregional relations.

1. A normative debate?

Founded on normative arguments, the EU is regularly pressured by civil society actors to use its potential leverage to pressure for ‘improved’ human rights conduct in Southeast Asia. But is this an adequate approach? Can one even speak of a common perception of human rights both between and within the two regions? How and why have these conceptions changed, since human rights became an explicit interregional issue in the 1990s and how serious are the actors about them? These were the guiding questions for the presentations of Cesar Ong, student of law at the San Beda College , Manila, and Imke Pente, PhD Candidate at Freie Universität Berlin, as well as the following open debate among the workshop participants. The panel was chaired by Kilian Spandler, Assistant Director of the South and East Asia division at IFAIR e. V.

2. Varying perceptions on the concept of human rights

Ong outlined in the first panel presentation that both regions hold different views on human rights concepts. The EU is focused on a universalist understanding, ASEAN and its member states see human rights in a more nuanced, ‘unique’ light. In this vein, democracy has to be interpreted before the background of distinct historic and cultural positions of the respective countries. Otherwise, it will be understood as a colonial product and a Western concept. With reference to Huntington, Ong added that the East is thought to have its own Asian values by many scholars. But not only varying perceptions make an interregional human rights dialogue difficult. A different way of communication between both regions has to be noted: The EU is primarily outcome-oriented in its debates, both on bilateral and supra-national level; ASEAN countries do not regard this as crucial, they focus on a more informal cooperation culture. Thus, any progress in Western human rights discourse has to be interpreted in the light of the instrumental value of the discourse for ASEAN: participation is primarily taking place in order to gain reputation vis-á-vis the Western world and to play at the international table.

3. Economic interests vs. human rights?

In the following, Pente in her presentation first of all outlined the state of democracy in SEA (see Figure 1): No consolidated democracy exists as of today, Thailand features a deteriorating democracy record and the CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) countries qualify as full autocracies. Against this backdrop, one could expect a strong effort by the European Union to improve the human rights situation in these countries, given the EU’s self-perception as a normative actor. Yet, proactive efforts by the EU to enhance human rights and democracy through conditionality and outspoken criticism were rejected by the ASEAN member states as neo-colonialism. In order not to jeopardize economic opportunities in the ASEAN region, the European Commission resolved the trade-off between human rights policies and business interests in favor of the latter. However, the extensive strategic announcements by the Commission failed to be substantiated due to reservations of some EU member states towards human rights violations in some of the ASEAN member states, most notably Indonesia, Cambodia and Myanmar.

 Democracy Status of ASEAN member states

Figure 1: Democracy status of ASEAN member states

Pente illustrated that ASEAN is “not more than the sum of its parts”: a close look at the ASEAN Charter, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights and the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration reveals that the member states keep on holding the reins. Regional commitments do not exceed the national status quo and are thus limited to the common denominator. On these grounds, Pente concludes that the national governments’ attitudes to human rights and democracy are pivotal for regional advancements.

4. The case of Myanmar

Both presenters picked up the case of Myanmar as crucial for understanding the human rights discourse between and within both regions. As Ong outlined, differences between EU and ASEAN became evident in the 1991 dispute on how to react to human rights violations in Myanmar, when the EU pressured the Southeast Asian nations for a critical response. ASEAN has been particularly critical of any links of foreign aid to policy demands from the European side which, as Ong depicts, has to be interpreted in the light of fears of neocolonialism Pente agreed to this description: The Myanmar case blocked EU-ASEAN cooperation due to concerns by ASEAN member states for interference in their national affairs – especially when they were in the focus of the international debate just as much (e.g. Indonesia and the case of East Timor). More recently, however, ASEAN has proven to be able to take a tough stance on human rights issues, e.g. during the 2007 crackdowns on protesters again in Myanmar, as Ong describes. Pente interprets this finding: ASEAN questions any interference especially from a perspective of Western values, at the same time it is responsive to potential economic gains – after the FTA negotiations between both regions began, ASEAN at least officially committed to human rights and democracy.

5. Strengthen civil society and further labor standards in ASEAN?

Pente put forward clear recommendations from these issues: First, the EU should strengthen civil society in SEA and thus the demand side for human rights. Second, the EU should link market access to labor rights and thus use its economic leverage. Some participants agreed and presented concrete cases, e.g. from Malaysia, where standards for palm oil production already improved due to this ‘sneaky approach’. Still, a culturally sensitive approach should be taken, other participants added. It is telling that HR issues are not discussed in the political community pillar, but on the social and cultural level. And it has to be ensured that EU Human Rights policy is not separating ASEAN into a ‘pro- and anti-Western’-fraction. Thus, the member states’ international involvement in human rights and democracy-related debates should complement the support to national civil society groups. It was mentioned that poor labor standards are considered a comparative advantage and base for economic development by governments. It was added, that economic development at the same time has the function of enhancing government capacities to a degree that enables HR protection in all its dimensions in the first place. Last but not least, ASEAN governments are partially not even exerting effective governance over their own people and territory. Under these conditions, ‘politics of survival’ are the consequence, where institutions are both feared (for their potential autonomy) and fostered (to solve long-term capacity problems) by national governments.

At the same time, Ong suggested that the international community should continue to assert that Human Rights be included as a prerequisite in gaining international legitimacy. While the external pressure may have proved to provide slow results, the ASEAN’s desire to gain international legitimacy will be a potent tool for it to take the Human Rights issue seriously. This necessarily complements the proposal of Pente in leveraging the Human Rights issue through bilateral channels instead of engaging the ASEAN as one monolithic bloc.

6. The EU side of the coin

Moreover, it was also noted that the ‘Western’ HR concept could be outdated and needs to be revised (e.g. issues of statelessness and international migration are missed out, participants added). Additionally, the HR-conduct of the EU needs to improve dramatically if it is not to lose its credibility, for example when it comes to intra-EU migration (e.g. of the Roma minority) just as much as the dramatic refugee situation on the EU borders. While these shortcomings of the EU might not attract public attention, ASEAN elites are taking note and hold a mirror up to EU delegations when discussing HR.

 Reported by Cesar Ong, Imke Pente and Lukas Rudolph

Read the reports of the other panels and find additional information on the workshop on the >> [Impact Group website].

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