Lebanon has long been marked by recurring violent confrontations with Israel, particularly involving Hezbollah as a central non-state actor. In this context, ceasefires “are not merely about halting violence between belligerents; they are also intended to protect civilians, facilitate humanitarian access, and create openings for broader political negotiations” (DiCarlo, 2022). Despite repeated agreements — including a ceasefire in November 2024 and the most recent arrangements in April 2026 — violations have remained frequent. According to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon the previous ceasefire has been violated almost 7800 times through air violations and over 100 through air attacks, almost all of them originating from the Israeli side. Additionally, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has maintained a continued presence on Lebanese territory. Hezbollah, by contrast, has used the ceasefire period to regroup and prepare for renewed confrontation after severe blows suffered in 2024/25. Today, the urgency of ceasefires is underscored by the humanitarian toll, with over 2,000 deaths and more than one million people displaced since Lebanon entered the broader regional conflict between the US, Israel and Iran on March 2, 2026. This article argues that the fragility of the current ceasefire can partly be traced to a set of difficult, mutually reinforcing dynamics, in which Israel perceives Hezbollah’s military capabilities as a significant threat and seeks to contain them, while such actions, in turn, reinforce Hezbollah’s rationale for retaining its weapons. At the same time, the Lebanese government operates under substantial constraints and must proceed cautiously in attempting to alter this dynamic. Accordingly, the analysis focuses on three factors: conflict parties and external actors, the cycle of reinforced mistrust, and the constrained agency of the Lebanese state.
Conflict parties and external actors
Hezbollah, as a powerful militant and political non-state actor based primarily in southern Lebanon, remains a central party to the conflict, with its continued armament serving as Israel’s primary justification for military operations. At the same time, statements by its Secretary General, Naim Qassem, that the organization is keeping its “finger on the trigger” signal both restraint and readiness. This suggests adherence to a ceasefire, to which Hezbollah is not formally a party, while underscoring its capacity to either uphold or undermine the agreement.
The United States, in turn, acts as a key broker, exerting political pressure on Israel to accept and maintain ceasefire agreements. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly acknowledged that his acceptance of a ceasefire came “at the request of my friend, President Trump,” while President Donald Trump reinforced this pressure by declaring on Truth Social that further Israeli attacks on Lebanon were “prohibited.” Beyond this, Iran links the Lebanese front to the broader regional war with the United States and Israel by explicitly incorporating Lebanon into its own ceasefire considerations, making its inclusion a condition for de-escalatory measures such as the opening of the Strait of Hormuz. Taken together, these dynamics suggest a fragile balance of regional and international power, within which Lebanon’s role as an independent actor appears constrained, while the country also serves as a central arena of competing interests.
The cycle of reinforced mistrust
Israel and Hezbollah have taken measures they perceive as necessary for their own security, yet these same measures reinforce the insecurity of the other. Rather than stabilizing the situation, this dynamic perpetuates mistrust and contributes directly to the fragility of ceasefires (Goodridge, 2026).
From Israel’s perspective, Hezbollah continues to pose a significant threat to its northern border, a perception shaped by the group’s sophisticated armaments, largely financed by Iran and delivered via Syria. Since 2024, Hezbollah has suffered considerable setbacks that have weakened its operational capacity: the collapse of the Assad regime as part of the Shia Crescent disrupted key logistical channels from Iran to Lebanon, Israeli intelligence operations penetrated its communication systems, and targeted strikes—including the killing of its Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah—degraded both its leadership and capabilities. However, these measures, while intended by Israel to enhance its own security, do not resolve the underlying threat perception. Instead, they reinforce Hezbollah’s conviction that Israel remains a persistent danger to Lebanon, thereby strengthening its justification for retaining its weapons. Hezbollah, in turn, insists it will only disarm once Israel withdraws fully to the UN-demarcated Blue Line of 2006 (S/RES/1701) while Israel refuses to withdraw as long as Hezbollah remains armed, creating a self-reinforcing deadlock. In this way, actions taken by each side to increase security simultaneously deepen the insecurity of the other.
The Lebanese government, which in principle shares the goal of restoring a state monopoly over the use of force, has sought to engage Israel in negotiations over a permanent security arrangement since March 2026. However, some of these efforts gained traction only following renewed U.S. diplomatic pressure, culminating in Israel’s agreement to a ceasefire.
The Lebanese Government: Constrained Agency
This dynamic raises the question of what the Lebanese state can realistically do to alter the situation. While the government has demonstrated a willingness to act decisively, its room for maneuver remains constrained. Any attempt to disarm Hezbollah by force through its own military – Lebanese Armed Forces – risks triggering a renewed civil war, particularly in a context marked by rising sectarian tensions and large-scale displacement. This necessitates a cautious approach. Nevertheless, the current democratically legitimate government, led by President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, has taken several notable steps. Following the escalation of March 2026, it banned all activity by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Lebanon and all Hezbollah’s military activities and expelled the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon (Khawaja and Mansour, 2026). At the same time, it continues to pursue diplomatic avenues, including the prospect of a formal peace agreement with Israel. Such an outcome would not be without precedent: the 1982 Israel–Lebanon agreement briefly opened the possibility of normalization before collapsing under Syrian pressure. Today, with Syria’s influence significantly diminished, similar initiatives may appear more feasible. However, the Lebanese government must simultaneously contend with multidimensional severe economic, social, and humanitarian crises, which further limit its capacity to act.
Conclusion
The persistence of yet another fragile ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah is not simply the result of isolated violations but reflects deeper structural dynamics. Selected current examples were used to highlight how conflict parties and external actors shape both the emergence and the endurance of ceasefire agreements, often limiting the agency of those directly affected. At the same time, the underlying cycle of reinforcing mistrust between Israel and Hezbollah generates situations in which measures intended to enhance security instead deepen insecurity. Within this context, the Lebanese state seems to remain constrained in its ability to act. Against this backdrop, ceasefires appear less as definitive steps toward lasting peace than as temporary arrangements shaped by these overlapping constraints.
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