China’s Strategic Self-Reliance: Managing Interdependence Under Vision 2030

China’s economic strategy has long been shaped by Five-Year Plans, first introduced in the 1950s as a roadmap for national development, which still guide the country’s social and economic priorities today. In March 2026, the legislature of the People’s Republic of China approved the 15th Five-Year Plan (Vision 2030), which places particular emphasis on innovation as a primary driver of growth.

At the centre of this next phase is a renewed and intensified focus on self-reliance (zili ziqiang 自立自强). In Chinese policy discourse, self-reliance refers to the strengthening of domestic capacity in strategically critical sectors, particularly those linked to national security and long-term economic competitiveness. At the 2023 National People’s Congress, Xi Jinping explicitly linked the objective of achieving greater self-reliance to rising geopolitical tensions (De Soyres et al., 2024). 

This strategy is implemented through state-led industrial policy. This includes targeted investment in priority sectors, support for domestic firms, restrictions on sensitive technology transfers, and efforts to develop what policymakers describe as “secure and controllable” supply chains (Wang, 2026). Under Xi Jinping, self-reliance is increasingly framed as part of a broader vision of national rejuvenation. By combining technological independence with supply chain security and domestic innovation capacity, the strategy places strategic priority on sectors such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence, advanced manufacturing, green energy, and biotechnology. 

A broader question sits at the centre of China’s economic strategy: how can Beijing reduce external technological dependence while remaining deeply integrated within global markets? As self-reliance expands beyond manufacturing and energy into areas such as artificial intelligence, data, and advanced computing, the relationship between national security, innovation, and globalisation is becoming increasingly complex. This article contends that China’s self-reliance agenda should be understood not as a rejection of globalisation, but as an effort to selectively manage interdependence in sectors considered critical to national development and security. 

Foundation: Self-Reliance Beyond Protectionism

China’s emphasis on self-reliance reflects a continuation of an established strategy rather than a new policy direction. Self-reliance is also rooted in deeper ideological continuity. In 2018, Xi Jinping revived Mao Zedong’s slogan of “regeneration through one’s own efforts,” reinforcing self-sufficiency as a persistent theme within Chinese political thinking (Campanella, 2023). Earlier initiatives—spanning the 11th Five-Year Plan through to more recent climate commitments under Xi Jinping—illustrate how Beijing has already applied this model successfully within the energy sector. Through sustained state-led investment, China has built significant domestic capacity in renewable technologies, leading some analysts to argue that “China has already won the battle for the energy of the 21st century” (Watts, 2025).

Growing external pressures have intensified the urgency of this agenda. Since 2018, escalating tariffs and trade restrictions between China and the United States have heightened concerns in Beijing about technological dependence and supply chain vulnerabilities (Alfaro and Chor, 2023; Utar et al., 2023). This is particularly visible in the technology sector. Export restrictions imposed by the United States on advanced semiconductors, including high-performance chips produced by Nvidia, have exposed China’s continued reliance on foreign inputs in artificial intelligence development.
However, China’s self-reliance agenda should not be understood as outright protectionism or economic isolation. Policies such as the “dual circulation” strategy introduced in 2020 reflect an attempt to strengthen domestic resilience while maintaining selective integration with global markets. In this sense, self-reliance functions less as a rejection of globalisation and more as a strategy of risk management in an increasingly uncertain geopolitical environment.

Case Study: Manus AI and the Boundaries of Technological Self-Reliance

Artificial intelligence differs from traditional industries in that it relies not only on physical infrastructure but also on access to data, computational power, and highly specialised talent. These characteristics make it both economically significant and strategically sensitive, placing it at the centre of contemporary geopolitical competition. The Manus AI case is particularly useful because it brings together several of the core issues at the heart of China’s self-reliance agenda, including access to advanced chips, the movement of high-value technology firms across borders, foreign ownership of strategic assets, and the governance of AI related data and talent. Recent developments involving Manus AI, a Chinese-founded artificial intelligence firm established by Xiao Hong in 2022, provide a useful case through which to examine these dynamics in practice. Manus operates within a segment of the AI ecosystem that depends heavily on advanced semiconductors and high-performance computing—areas where global supply chains remain deeply interconnected. 

In mid-2025, Manus relocated its operations to Singapore, “stoking speculation that the move was aimed at facilitating easier access to Nvidia chips amid US export controls to China.” (Wang, 2025). In December 2025, the company was acquired by the US technology company Meta. However, by April 2026, the transaction was blocked by Chinese authorities (McMahon, 2026), showing the increasing sensitivity surrounding cross-border transfers of advanced technology. This sequence of events highlights a broader tension within China’s innovation ecosystem. On the one hand, Chinese technology firms continue to operate within global markets, engaging with international capital, infrastructure, and talent networks. On the other hand, Beijing is placing increasing emphasis on ensuring that strategically significant capabilities, particularly in artificial intelligence, remain aligned with domestic development priorities.

The Manus case illustrates how the meaning of “self-reliance” is evolving. In earlier phases of industrial policy, the focus was primarily on building domestic manufacturing capacity or securing energy supplies. By contrast, emerging technologies such as AI are closely tied to intangible assets, including data, algorithms, and highly skilled human capital. As a result, the cross-border movement of firms, talent, and intellectual property is increasingly viewed not only through a commercial lens but also as a matter of strategic importance. Within this framework, interventions can be understood less as a rejection of global engagement and more as an attempt to manage the outward flow of critical technological capabilities. This is particularly evident in relation to ownership, competitive advantage, and systems trained on domestically sourced data. As technological competition intensifies between China and the United States, control over these capabilities is becoming increasingly central to national strategy. In this context, maintaining domestic strength in frontier technologies is closely linked to long-term economic resilience and strategic autonomy. 

While more recent, The Manus case is not an isolated example. Similar dynamics can be observed in other strategically significant sectors, particularly semiconductors and telecommunications. Companies such as Huawei and the Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) have become central to Beijing’s efforts to strengthen domestic technological capabilities in response to external constraints. In both cases, state support has been accompanied by a growing emphasis on reducing reliance on foreign technologies and securing greater control over critical components of the innovation ecosystem. Viewed alongside developments involving firms such as Huawei and SMIC, the Manus case suggests that China’s self-reliance agenda is increasingly concerned not only with manufacturing capacity, but also with the governance of data, talent, intellectual property, and technological ownership. 

Implications and Outlook

Domestically, the strategy may strengthen China’s resilience to external shocks by reducing reliance on foreign inputs in strategically sensitive sectors. However, innovation literature suggests that inter-organisational collaboration enables firms to access scarce and non-replicable resources, combining them with internal capabilities to enhance innovation and competitiveness ( Yamakawa et al., 2008) (Fu et al., 2022). This reflects a wider reassessment of the balance between openness and autonomy in an increasingly uncertain geopolitical environment. At the same time, the strategy presents structural challenges, including the risk of inefficiencies and the potential difficulty of achieving breakthroughs in highly specialised fields that have historically depended on international collaboration.

China’s push for self-reliance carries significant implications for the global economy, particularly within advanced technology sectors. As illustrated by the Manus AI case, efforts to retain control over critical capabilities—including data, talent, and computational infrastructure—may reduce the influence traditionally held by Western economies. As technological competition intensifies, this recalibration is unlikely to remain confined to China alone, but may instead signal a shift in how states approach economic security and innovation in the global system. These dynamics could contribute to a more fragmented global landscape, characterised by parallel and, in some cases, competing technological ecosystems.

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