Few states in the contemporary international system have navigated the structural constraints of smallness with as much strategic foresight as Singapore. When the country gained full independence in 1965 under difficult circumstances, the multi-ethnic city-state established a foreign policy of remarkable coherence. With no natural resources, lacking strategic depth, and located at the confluence of competing great-power interests along one of the world’s most frequented maritime corridors, Singapore’s survival and prosperity were never guaranteed (Kun et al. 2024). Yet what has emerged from these origins is a model of small-state statecraft, with a strategy based on pragmatic non-alignment, asymmetric relationships and behind-the-scenes diplomacy that can even function under the conditions of a weakened international order (Yacoob 2025). Whether this posture of cautious restraint can still be maintained as polarization deepens is the central strategic question confronting Singapore’s foreign policy establishment today.
This article examines the evolution, underlying logic, and principal instruments of Singapore’s foreign policy, with particular attention to its navigation of the intensifying rivalry between the United States and the People’s Republic of China.
Historical Context and Structural Vulnerability
Singapore’s foreign policy cannot be separated from the existential anxieties that defined its founding. In August 1965, the newly sovereign ‘little red dot’, under its most prominent state leader, Lee Kuan Yew, confronted a uniquely precarious constellation of challenges. Its territory, roughly 720 square kilometres, offered no strategic hinterland (Yeo 2017). Its population, predominantly ethnic Chinese, alongside significant Malay and Indian communities (Parameswaran 2024), inhabited a Malay regional environment in which societal tensions persisted. Indonesia, still recovering from recent upheavals, and Malaysia, from which Singapore had just been separated, formed its immediate neighbourhood in a regional order defined by Cold War bipolarity and decolonization.
Against these structural liabilities, Singapore’s geographical position along the Strait of Malacca, through which a significant share of global seaborne trade flows, constituted both a strategic asset and a source of vulnerability. Its leadership drew two foundational lessons from this situation: first, that economic indispensability and institutional competence could partially substitute for territorial power; and second, that no single external patron could be permitted to exercise dominant influence over the island’s affairs.
Core Principles of Singapore’s Foreign Policy
Singapore’s external relations are animated by a set of durable, if not always formally codified, doctrinal principles, sometimes even treated “as a kind of theology” (Loh 2026). The most relevant of these is pragmatism – an unsentimental orientation towards policy outcomes without ideological commitment. Singapore’s ruling People’s Action Party (PAP), which has governed without interruption since 1959, has institutionalized this disposition as a governing mindset that privileges functional effectiveness over normative consistency. In foreign policy terms, this translates into a willingness to engage with states across the full spectrum of regime types, and such engagement serves Singapore’s core interests of sovereignty, security, and economic prosperity. However, maintaining as many reliable partnerships as possible leads to the dilemma that “strong official statements […] can mean the loss of strategic ambiguity” (Fang 2024), therefore Singaporean leaders usually rely on careful statements.
A second foundational principle is strategic autonomy – what scholars have variously termed ‘equidistant diplomacy’ or ‘hedging’ (Teo & Koga 2021: 381) – which denotes Singapore’s deliberate refusal to formally align with any single great power. Its approach is better characterized as ‘balancing without alignment’: the simultaneous cultivation of security relationships with the US and economic interdependence with China, without permitting either to become structurally dominant – or, as Foreign Minister Balakrishnan encapsulated this disposition: Singapore “does not take sides” but rather “upholds principles” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2026).
Complementing these principles are credible deterrence, underwritten by a defense establishment whose capability substantially exceeds what Singapore’s size would suggest, a “globally wired economy [and] internal order in a multiracial society” (Loh 2026). Furthermore, Singapore upholds an ironclad commitment to the rules-based international order, multilateralism, and freedom of navigation. The latter reflects not idealism but pure self-interest: for a small, trade-dependent state, the erosion of multilateral norms and the corrosion of international law represent existential threats. Singapore’s institutional quality, consistently ranked among the world’s least corrupt and most efficiently governed states (Ho 2022: 87 f.), further enhances its diplomatic credibility and its ability to serve as a trusted broker across geopolitical divides.
Between Great Powers: The United States and China
Singapore’s navigation of great-power competition is perhaps the most operationally complex dimension of its foreign policy. Its relationship with Washington is based on a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 1990, which has been extended several times and grants the US access to Singaporean military facilities, including naval bases (Kuik 2021: 307). In addition, Singapore conducts regular joint military exercises with American forces and recently confirmed the additional acquisition of eight F-35A fighter jets (Ministry of Defence of Singapore 2025). This security partnership functions as a de facto alignment and raises the question of whether the state can still be defined as politically neutral.
Yet Singapore has been equally ambitious in fostering its relationship with Beijing. China is Singapore’s largest trading partner, and the two states maintain an institutional framework for bilateral cooperation, such as the Suzhou Industrial Park established in 1994. The Agreement on Defence Exchanges and Security Cooperation , signed in 2008, further institutionalized the security dimension of the relationship and is the most important framework that needs to be mentioned (Teo & Koga 2021: 379). Singapore has consistently avoided public criticism of Chinese policies, including in the field of human rights, while at the same time signaling its commitment to the principles of international law that underpin its own security.
Foreign Policy in an Era of Intensifying Rivalry
In recent years, the structural conditions that long secured Singapore’s strategic autonomy have deteriorated. The intensification of U.S.–China systemic competition has narrowed the diplomatic breathing space available to neutral states, as Washington and Beijing both put pressure on regional partners to signal alignment (Kuik 2021: 301). The dominant arenas where this pressure becomes visible are technology supply chains, multilateral forum participation, or public statements on contested issues. For example, the South China Sea dispute remains the most prominent regional flashpoint. Singapore’s response to the 2016 UNCLOS tribunal ruling illustrated the dilemma: Singapore then affirmed the legal validity of the ruling while at the same time the state was no claimant and acted restrained (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016).
The case of Taiwan and decoupling tendencies in the regional semiconductor industry have further increased these pressures. Singapore’s trade-dependent economy renders it acutely sensitive to the disruptions of global supply chains, yet it can do little to secure them. In addition, the return of a more transactional and isolationist American foreign policy has further raised questions about the future of American commitments in the Indo-Pacific, forcing Singapore to seek for stronger partnerships elsewhere. On multilateral issues such as the war in Ukraine, Singapore chose a strong response and even “imposed rare unilateral sanctions on Russia” (Fang 2026). On the other hand, regarding the conflict in Gaza, Singapore’s expressions were cautious, mainly supporting deescalation and affirming the importance of humanitarian law (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2023) to preserve its credibility as a neutral partner.
Implications for Small-State Theory and Practice
Singapore’s foreign policy offers a fascinating case study for small-state behaviour on the global stage. Typically, small states are portrayed as structurally constrained actors, subject to systemic power politics. Singapore’s experience challenges this view. By leveraging institutional quality, economic connectivity, and principled multilateralism, the city-state has exercised diplomatic influence disproportionate to its material capabilities.
Yet the transferability of the Singaporean model is limited by internal and external factors. Its success is inseparable from the institutional capacity of the PAP, the specific geopolitical setting, and a historical context in which the liberal order provided a systemic advantage for small-state prosperity. As that order erodes, the assumptions forming Singapore’s strategy require constant re-examination. Today, the luxury of non-alignment may prove increasingly difficult to sustain in a world of coercive economic statecraft and weakened multilateral governance. Singapore’s current standing may, in this sense, be insightful for a broader variety of small and medium-sized states navigating in a contested international order – not because its model could be copied in general, but because the strategic dilemmas it faces are more and more universal in a globalized world.
Conclusions
Singapore’s foreign policy represents a sophisticated exercise in small-state statecraft, characterised by strategic autonomy, institutional credibility, and the management of non-aligned relationships. While intensifying great-power rivalry tests the parameters of this agenda, the underlying logic of Singapore’s strategy, namely balancing without alignment and leveraging institutional competence as a source of influence, holds analytical and practical significance. For policymakers, Singapore offers not a blueprint to be replicated, but a valuable case study through which
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About The Author
Jannik Rickert is regional coordinator for South- & Southeast Asia.
