The Road to February 28
The coordinated assault by the United States and Israel against Iran on February 28, 2026, followed years of strategic rivalry, nuclear suspicion, proxy warfare, and failed diplomatic efforts. According to reporting in the New York Times, the immediate trigger was the collapse of negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program and Washington’s expanded demands, which extended beyond uranium enrichment to include missile dismantlement and changes in Iran’s regional posture.
In the weeks preceding the attack, indirect talks had been mediated by Oman (Wong/Crowley 2026). The U.S. position hardened to a demand for “zero enrichment,” which Iran rejected as incompatible with its sovereign rights under the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (Wong/Crowley 2026). Article IV of the NPT recognizes the right of parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under safeguards, a provision repeatedly invoked by Iranian officials. The U.S. administration framed its strategy as preemptive defense. President Donald Trump stated that he would not allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon (Wong/Crowley 2026). Israel similarly regarded Iran’s missile program, proxy networks, and potential nuclear latency as existential threats (Erlanger 2026), consistent with its longstanding doctrine emphasizing preemption (Talbot 2023).
As diplomacy deteriorated, military assets were repositioned in the region, leading critics to argue that negotiations may have served as strategic cover for force deployment (Wong/Crowley 2026). On February 28, coordinated airstrikes targeted military command centers, missile installations, and senior officials across several Iranian cities. Most consequentially, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who had served as Iran’s Supreme Leader since 1989 and was the country’s highest political and religious authority, was killed when his residential compound in Tehran was struck (Chutel/Richter 2026; Fassihi 2026). President Trump announced that bombing would continue as long as necessary to achieve peace (Chutel/Richter 2026) and urged Iranian forces to lay down their arms, while Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described the moment as an opportunity for the Iranian people to shape their own future (Chutel/Richter 2026; Troianovski 2026; Wong/Crowley 2026). The stated objective of preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons thus became intertwined with rhetoric suggestive of regime change.
Iran’s Retaliation and Regional Escalation
Iran’s response was swift. Within hours, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps launched missile and drone attacks against Israel. Israeli defense systems intercepted many of the incoming projectiles, though the attacks had an immediate psychological impact.
Simultaneously, Iran targeted U.S. military installations in Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain. U.S. Central Command reported that American forces had “successfully defended against hundreds of Iranian missile and drone attacks” and that damage was “minimal and has not impacted operations”. Nevertheless, debris from intercepted missiles reportedly killed one civilian in Abu Dhabi (Chutel/Richter 2026).
Beyond direct strikes, Iran leveraged its position along the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20 percent of global oil shipments transit daily (Chutel/Richter 2026; U.S. Energy Information Administration 2025). Shipping costs rose and oil prices surged. Under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part III, transit passage through international straits must not be impeded, meaning any sustained disruption would raise significant legal concerns. Iran’s retaliation also carried the risk of broader regional escalation through allied actors in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen (Erlanger 2026), underscoring the conflict’s potential to expand beyond direct interstate confrontation.
Civilian Harm and Domestic Turmoil
Although U.S. officials emphasized that early waves targeted military infrastructure, civilian casualties quickly became a focal point of international criticism. According to the Washington-based Iranian rights group HRANA, cumulative casualties since the start of the conflict on February 28 have reached at least 1,708 fatalities, including 1,205 civilians (among them at least 194 children) and 187 military personnel, while 316 deaths remain unclassified due to insufficient information. Particularly devastating was the strike on the Shajareh Tayyebeh elementary school in Minab, Hormozgan Province (Solomon et al. 2026). Iran’s foreign minister described it as a school “bombed in broad daylight”. U.S. Central Command stated it was investigating and emphasized that protecting civilians is of utmost importance (Solomon et al. 2026).
International humanitarian law, particularly the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I (1977), requires distinction between civilian and military targets and prohibits disproportionate attacks (Art. 48, 51). Whether the Minab strike violated these principles became a matter of dispute.
Ayatollah Khamenei’s death triggered both celebration and mourning. Communications disruptions made it difficult to gauge nationwide sentiment (Fassihi/Triebert 2026). Iran’s constitution provides that the 1979 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Art. 107) stipulates the Assembly of Experts selects the supreme leader. Following Khamenei’s death, an interim leadership council was announced to oversee governance (Fassihi 2026). The domestic situation thus combined jubilation, fear, uncertainty, and the possibility of power struggles within the elite.
Self-Defense or Preventive War?
The distinction between preemptive and preventive force is central to the legal assessment of the February 28 strikes. While preemptive self-defense refers to action taken against an imminent armed attack, preventive war targets a more distant or speculative threat and remains highly contested under international law.
The U.S.–Israeli strikes on Iranian cities immediately shifted the dispute to the United Nations, where Iran requested an emergency Security Council meeting within hours of the attacks (Chutel/Richter 2026; Wolfe/Ortiz 2026). The debate centered on the interpretation of the UN Charter, particularly Articles 2(4) and 51. Article 2(4) prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, while Article 51 recognizes the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs. The International Court of Justice has interpreted this right as requiring an actual armed attack or, in limited circumstances, an imminent one, as in Nicaragua v. United States (1986). The core legal question was therefore whether the February 28 strikes responded to an imminent threat or constituted preventive action.
The United States and Israel characterized their actions as anticipatory self-defense, citing Iran’s nuclear program, missile capabilities, and regional proxy networks as direct threats (Wong/Crowley 2026; Erlanger 2026). Their reasoning echoed the 19th-century Caroline standard, which permits preemptive force only when the threat is “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation” (Webster 1842). Critics argued that long-term strategic risks fall outside this narrow threshold and amount to unlawful preventive war.
Iran rejected the strikes as a flagrant violation of the UN Charter, asserting that no armed attack had occurred and thus Article 51 was inapplicable. It framed its missile and drone attacks against Israel and U.S. bases in Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates as lawful self-defense. While most projectiles were intercepted and operational damage remained limited, at least one civilian death occurred in Abu Dhabi from debris of an intercepted missile (Chutel/Richter 2026). Gulf states not involved in the initial assault argued that their sovereignty had been violated, illustrating how self-defense claims can extend conflict across borders (Wolfe/Ortiz 2026).
The involvement of third states highlighted Article 51’s collective self-defense dimension and the requirement of proportionality. Even where self-defense is invoked, international humanitarian law continues to apply, including the principles of distinction and proportionality. Incidents such as the bombardment of an elementary school in Minab and missile impacts near civilian areas in Gulf states underscored the practical challenges of adhering to these standards (Solomon et al. 2026).
Security Council deliberations were constrained by geopolitics. With the United States holding veto power and other permanent members divided, the Council functioned primarily as a forum for debate rather than enforcement (Wolfe/Ortiz 2026). The broader implication is significant: if anticipatory self-defense against potential nuclear threats is accepted, the threshold for lawful force may shift; if classified as preventive war, consistent enforcement of Charter limits becomes essential to preserve the prohibition on the use of force.
Conclusion and Outlook
The U.S.–Israeli assault on Iran has reshaped the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. Militarily, it demonstrated the capacity to eliminate leadership and strike deeply into Iranian territory. Politically, it created a leadership vacuum in Tehran and reopened questions of regime continuity. Economically, it destabilized global energy markets through the Strait of Hormuz. Legally, it intensified debate over the scope of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter and the prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4).
Whether this conflict leads to regime transformation, prolonged regional confrontation, or renewed diplomacy remains uncertain. A governing system built over nearly five decades “will not easily disintegrate under air power alone”. Historical experience offers grounds for caution. U.S.-led military interventions have rarely produced stable democratic transitions. In Iraq after 2003 and Afghanistan after 2001, regime change initially removed authoritarian governments but was followed by prolonged instability, violence, and fragile or ultimately reversed democratic institutions. In Libya after 2011, external intervention contributed to the fall of the regime yet left a fractured state marked by competing authorities. In this light, the death of a supreme leader may constitute a historic rupture, but it does not in itself guarantee political liberalization. External military pressure can weaken a regime; it does not automatically construct democratic institutions.
Ultimately, the crisis tests not only regional stability but also the credibility of the international legal order. If preventive war becomes normalized as a tool of non-proliferation policy, the foundational principles of the UN Charter risk erosion. If, however, diplomacy and legal restraint regain primacy, the prohibition on force may yet be reaffirmed. It remains to be seen whether this crisis will lead to genuine political reform, prolonged conflict, or a reaffirmation of international law.
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About The Author
Maike Dreesbeimdieke studies international relations and diplomacy at the University of Trier. She completed her bachelor’s degree in political science and German studies at the University of Halle. Her research focuses on the Middle East region. She is a member of the board of IFAIR e.V. and serves as regional director.
